This article argues that a rigorous application of simple game theory tools may provide unambiguous predictions about the behavior of teams in sports. As an illustration, the authors analyze the merits of two controversial changes in soccer rules, namely, the "three-point victory" and the "golden goal." Building on well-accepted premises, the authors show that contrary to the common belief, the incentives of teams to play offensively may be lower under the three-point victory than under the traditional two-point victory. They also provide clear and simple recommendations for the improvement of these rules.
. The first article looks at serve-and-return play at Wimbledon. The second and third analyze penalty kicks in European soccer leagues. All three show that the data support the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prediction of game theory. The fourth article also deals with soccer. It shows that although the behavior of teams is roughly consistent with rationality (losing teams adopt more offensive strategies than do winning teams), there is still a substantial component of irrationality or "passion," illustrated by the fact that teams perform better at home than they do away.
Although highly unintuitive and a major breakthrough for the development of the theory of games, the theory behind the minimax theorem has become standard in economics. The fact that the observed behavior is consistent with the fundamental insights of noncooperative game theory (as these articles demonstrate) is reassuring: It validates to a certain extent the use of theoretical models to describe and predict individual decision making. The strength of these articles relies on their ability to identify games where predicting the optimal strategy is very difficult for people unfamiliar with game theory but trivial for anyone with a minimum training in formal economics.
Starting from the conclusion that game theory usefully describes strategic interactions between individuals, this article has a different objective. First, we want to design a simple theoretical model that builds on standard and widely accepted premises and yet delivers theoretical predictions that are clear and simple to understand but at the same time are original and different from the common wisdom. Second, using the insights of our model, we propose simple changes in the rules that result in unambiguous improvements.
To focus the discussion, we concentrate on soccer and study the effects of the two major changes in rules introduced in international events such as the World Cup and the European Cup in the 1990s: the "three-point victory" (3PV) and the "golden goal" (GG). The 3PV system is used in league tournaments. Under this rule, the winner of a match obtains three points and the loser obtains zero points. In the case of a draw, each team obtains one point. The main argument in favor of this system-instead of the traditional two-point victory (2PV)-is simple. Adopting an offensive strategy increases the team's chances of scoring but also of conceding a goal. Therefore, teams are encouraged to play more offensively if the expected pay-off of breaking a tie is raised. The GG rule is used in elimination tournaments. Before its adoption, if two teams were tied at the end of the regular time, they would play a fixed 30 minutes overtime, and if the draw persisted, they would proceed to the penalty kicks. With the GG rule, the first team to score within the 30 minutes of overtime wins the match. If no one scores, the penalty kick method again determines the winner. Thus, the GG rule decreases the expected time of play and, other things being equal, the probability of reaching the penalty kick stage.
In this article and with the help of basic game theory, we qualify the ideas stated previously in favor of 3PV and GG. We show that although correct, the arguments are excessively simplistic because they only capture one effect of the rule on the behavior of teams. More specifically, we show in Proposition 1 that conditional on the game being tied, increasing the value of a victory will induce teams to adopt a more offensive strategy toward the end of the game in order to break the tie in one direction or another late in the match. However, under some conditions, it will also induce teams to use a more defensive strategy toward the beginning of the game in order to avoid being led early in the match and therefore keep the option of trying to break the tie late in the match. As a result, teams may on average play more defensively under 3PV than under 2PV. In other words, just by accounting for the possibility of changing the strategy over time, we show that a rule established to favor certain objectives (in this case, a more offensive play) may in fact be counterproductive using that same criterion. In Proposition 2, we argue that in the context of elimination tournaments, the GG rule modifies the pay-off of scoring (it prevents the team that concedes a goal to come back on the game) but not the incentives of teams to play offensively. Therefore, the popular idea that the introduction of the GG rule did not affect the strategy of teams and reduced the likelihood of reaching the penalty kicks stage is supported by our model. However, to extract the best from this rule, we need to merge it with the 3PV: As shown in Proposition 3, the combination of an increase in the expected value of breaking a tie (3PV rule) together with a reduction in the ability to come back in the game when the opponent scores (GG rule) is unambiguously beneficial for the game: It always induces teams to play more offensively than under 3PV alone. It is interesting that this possibility has never been considered in practice despite the simplicity of its implementation. To sum up, this article shows that basic game theory principles can be a powerful tool to obtain nontrivial theoretical insights about the behavior of players in sports. Moreover, a careful modeling can deliver unambiguous recommendations for the improvement of existing rules.
Before presenting our formal model, we would like to mention two other articles indirectly related to ours. Lazear and Rosen (1981) were among the first authors who used a game theoretic model to analyze the optimal design of tournaments. The article focuses on the incentives of players to exert costly effort as a function of the type of tournament (rank-order versus linear score differences). It shows that both reward schemes can induce the same (first-best) level of effort if teams are homogenous and risk neutral. Chan, Courty, and Hao (2001) consider a dynamic version of that model and show the superiority of linear schemes. However, if the public has a preference for uncertainty in the final outcome (which they label a "demand for suspense"), then rank-order tournaments may become preferable. The major difference between these articles and ours is that they focus on the incentives to exert costly effort, whereas we concentrate on the incentives for the strategic allocation of effort between offense and defense.
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A MODEL OF THE 3PV RULE
Strategies of Teams and Timing
We consider the simplest model needed to capture the main effects of the scoring system on the strategy of teams. Two teams, i ∈ {A, B}, play a match against each other. The winner of the game gets x (≥ 2) points, and the loser gets zero points. In the case of a draw, they both get one point. Teams are risk neutral and play in a league tournament. Their objective is to maximize the expected number of points collected in the game. 1 For simplicity, we assume that each team i decides at the beginning of the game (date t = 1) and at half-time (date t = 2) the strategy θ k i to be employed during the upcoming half period. Final pay-offs are realized at the end of the match (date t = 3). The parameter θ k i denotes the degree of "offensive" play by team i at date t, with higher values of θ denoting a more offensive strategy.
2
This value is selected by each team from the same compact set Θ = [θ, θ] . Playing more offensively increases the chances of scoring (and therefore the probability of winning the match) but also the chances of conceding a goal (and therefore the probability of losing the match). Naturally, the optimal strategy of each team will be contingent on the score at the time of selecting it.
Denote by τ ∈ {1, 2} the two half periods of play, that is, τ = 1 refers to the first half period (between t = 1 and t = 2) and τ = 2 refers to the second half period (between t = 2 and t = 3). Suppose that during each half period τ, only three events, e τ ∈ {a, o, b} concerning the score of the game may occur: team A scores either one more goal (e τ = a), the same number of goals (e τ = o), or one less goal (e τ = b) than team B. The relative likelihood of these events will depend on the strategies (θ A , θ B ) selected by both teams. From now on, we will call dates (t ∈ {1, 2, 3}) the beginning, half time, and end of the match and half periods (τ ∈ {1, 2}) the intervals of play going from beginning to half time and from half time to the end of the match. The timing of the game can thus be summarized in Figure 1 .
We analyze this game using a reduced-form model. Instead of defining the probability that each team scores a goal given both teams' strategies, we work directly with the probability that each team scores one more goal than its rival in each half period (events e τ = a and e τ = b) given the strategies θ We use the subscript n in α(•) and β(•) to denote the partial derivative with respect to the n th argument. These probabilities satisfy the following assumptions.
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Assumption 1 is quite uncontroversial. It simply states that choosing a more offensive strategy (higher θ) increases both the chances of scoring and the chances of conceding one more goal than the rival. 3 Furthermore, the marginal probability of scoring one more goal than the rival is decreasing in the level of offensive play, and the marginal probability of conceding one more goal than the rival is increasing in the level of offensive play. The conditions on the second derivatives will ensure the concavity of the overall maximization problem.
Assumption 2 states that the marginal effect of one team's level of offensive play is independent of the strategy employed by the other team. Assumption 3 states that teams are homogeneous, that is, equally strong. 4 Assumptions 2 and 3 are debatable to say the least. Homogeneity is more the exception than the rule: Few matches are played by teams of equal strength. As for the marginal effect of one team's strategy, it will often depend on the behavior of its opponent, although there is no consensus on its sign. 5 However, there are two interconnected reasons for maintaining these assumptions, the first of which is simplicity. Under these assumptions, we will obtain an equilibrium that is unique and easy to characterize. This will allow us to perform clear-cut comparative statistics about the effect of the reward system on the strategy of teams. Second and more important is transparency. Strategies can always have perverse indirect effects in pay-offs if we include some suitably chosen asymmetries in the teams and/or if we "twist sufficiently" the second and crossderivatives of the scoring probabilities. This is not the purpose of our article. Instead, we present a model that captures in the most uncontroversial way the strategic choice of teams in a soccer game. Then, we introduce as our only departure the ability of teams to change their strategy during the game (or more accurately, at half time). 
VALUE FUNCTIONS OF TEAMS AND ASSOCIATED PAY-OFFS
The pay-off of each team depends exclusively on the final score at date t = 3, that is, on the realization of the stochastic events e 1 and e 2 . If e 1 and e 2 are such that a occurs more often than b (both equally often, respectively; b more often than a, respectively), then team A wins (ties and loses, respectively) the match, in which case its pay-off is x (1 and 0, respectively) and the pay-off of team B is 0 (1 and x, respectively).
Denote by v , |e 1 ) denotes the value function of team i at half-time (t = 2) given the current score (i.e., the realization of event e 1 during the first half period) if strategies θ 2 A and θ 2 B are selected for the second half period. This game is solved by backward induction and using the subgame perfect equilibrium concept. The value function of team A at half time is as follows (the value function of B is determined in a similar way):
In words, if A is leading at half time (e 1 = a), then its value function v A 2 (⋅ | a) is the probability of not receiving one more goal than its opponent (1 -β) times the pay-off in case of victory (x) plus the probability of receiving one more goal than its opponent (β) times the payoff in case of a draw (1) , ) conditional on the event realized during the first half period (e 1 ∈ {a, o, b}):
where given Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the strategy θ 
When a team is leading at half time, it will choose the most defensive strategy (θ) during the second half period in order to minimize the probability of conceding a goal. Conversely, when a team is losing at half time, it will only be interested in maximizing its probability of scoring one more goal than the rival; therefore, it will choose the most offensive strategy ( ) θ . The most interesting situation arises when the score is tied at half time. In this case, the optimal second period strategy of both teams is given by Equation 1. The interpretation is simple. Each team sets its optimal level of offensive play for the second half period at the value where the marginal increase in the probability of a victory [α 1 (•)] weighted by the absolute increase in the pay-off [x -1] equals the marginal increase in the probability of a defeat [β 1 (•)] weighted by the absolute decrease in the pay-off [1] . Given teams' homogeneity, β 1 (θ′) ≡ α 2 (θ′) and θ** follows. 
Other things being equal, if teams are tied at half time, they will play more offensively during the second half period the greater is the value of a victory x. In fact, Equation 2 formalizes the standard (static) argument in favor of the 3PV relative to the 2PV system: By increasing the expected pay-off of breaking a tie, teams are encouraged to take more risks, that is, to adopt more offensive strategies.
As discussed in the introduction, our goal is not to refute this argument. On the contrary, we take this theory as our starting point and build on it. Yet, we claim that a static analysis may not be appropriate for this game. In other words, we ask whether the conclusion presented in Equation 2 holds when we assume that the game is dynamic and that strategies can be modified over time. The simplest way to answer this question is to study the two half-period models previously depicted. Having analyzed the Nash equilibrium of the second half-period subgame contingent on the score at half time, we now proceed by backward induction and determine the equilibrium strategy for the first half period selected at the beginning of the game. Naturally, teams are tied when the match starts. The value function of team A at the beginning of the match is as follows: The equilibrium strategy for the first half period then is as follows: 
where g = 1 -β(θ, θ) -α(θ**, θ**) and h = β(θ**, θ**). Differentiating Equation 3, we have the following:
Now, consider the following function:
F (•) corresponds to the difference between the probability of breaking a tie during the second half period and the probability that a team leading at half time loses its advantage. Note that it is increasing in θ**, the degree of offensive play in the second half when the match is tied by half time. We are now in a position to compare the strategies of teams under different scoring rules.
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Proposition 1: The 3PV rule. (a) θ*(2) = θ**(2): Under 2PV and conditional on the match being tied, teams do not change their strategy between the first and the second half. (b) θ**(x) > θ*(x) for all x > 2: Under 3PV and conditional on the match being tied, teams always play more offensively in the second half than in the first half. (c) If F(θ**, θ**) > 0, then ∂θ*(x) / ∂x < 0 < ∂θ**(x) / ∂x: Under 3PV and conditional on the match being tied, teams play more defensively in the first half and more offensively in the second half than under 2PV.
Proof. Part a is immediate if we set x = 2 in Equations 1 and 3. Given that α 2 (θ) / α 1 (θ) is increasing in θ and using Equations 1 and 3, we have
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Therefore, θ**(x) > θ*(x) for all x > 2 (part b). Last, from Equation 4, we deduce that g < h, or equivalently, F(θ**, θ**) > 0, is a sufficient condition for ∂θ*(x)/∂x < 0 (part c).
ٗ
The idea behind parts a and b rests on a standard option value argument. A team that concedes an early goal may still tie or win the match, and a team that scores an early goal may still tie or lose the match. Naturally, the absolute change in pay-off from victory to defeat and from defeat to victory is symmetric (|x|). The crucial issue when x > 2 is that the absolute change in pay-off between a tie and a defeat is smaller than the absolute change in pay-off between a tie and a victory (|1| < |x -1|). As a result, for x > 2, the benefits of scoring a goal early in the match (in terms of the increase in the expected final pay-off) are smaller than the costs of conceding an early goal (in terms of the decrease in the expected final pay-off). Stated differently, a team that receives an early goal can mostly hope to move from 0 to 1 point, whereas a team that scores an early goal still has chances of moving from x to 1 point. Because x -1 > 1, the possible loss after scoring an early goal is greater than the possible benefit after receiving a goal. Hence, teams prefer to play relatively more defensively at the beginning of the match so as to avoid conceding an early goal, even if it comes at the expense of also decreasing the chances of scoring. When x = 2, leading and being led are symmetric events in terms of expected payoffs. In that case, teams do not modify their strategy over time as long as the match is tied.
Building on that argument, part c shows that increasing the reward of a victory may have the perverse effect of increasing the incentives of teams to play defensively during the first half period (∂θ* / ∂x < 0). Indeed, suppose that the probability of breaking a tie during the second half, α(θ**, θ**) + β(θ**, θ**), is greater than the probability that a team leading in the score at half time does not win the match, 1 -β(θ, θ). Technically, this corresponds to F(θ**, θ**) > 0. In this case, the optimal strategy of teams is to play very defensively at the beginning of the game (so as to avoid being led early in the match) and very offensively toward the end (so as to break the tie in one direction or another late in the match). Note that a higher reward for a victory translates into a higher degree of offensive play during the second half (∂θ** / ∂x > 0), which itself implies a higher likelihood of defensive play during the first half (∂F / ∂θ** > 0).
Overall, a static reasoning suggests that increasing the pay-off x of a victory always increases the incentives of teams to play offensively (see Equation 2). However, this conclusion may not necessarily remain valid as soon as we account for the dynamic nature of the game and the possibility of changing strategies over time (see the numerical example in the next section). It is interesting that the usual argument against an excessively high pay-off x builds on a fairness consideration: Because soccer is an inherently stochastic game, high distortions in the pay-off of a victory may reward luck in excess. Our model argues that the optimal reward for a victory can be bounded above even if we consider exclusively the incentives of risk-neutral teams to play offensively.
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Our model could be extended in a number of directions. First, we could include some strategic interactions, such as a complementarity between the level of offensive play of a team and the marginal probability of scoring of its rival (α 12 [θ A , θ B ] > 0). Second, teams can realistically score two more goals than their opponent in a given half period, in which case a team leading at half time may still end up losing the game. Third and more important, if dynamic considerations are key, then choosing a strategy only twice during the match is still too simplistic. One may wonder what would be the equilibrium if teams can change their strategy as often as they wish. Our simple model cannot answer these questions.
An empirical test of our theory is, although interesting, out of the scope of this article. However, we may obtain some insights from previous empirical analyses. suggested that under 3PV, more goals are scored toward the end of the matches than toward the beginning. This seems consistent with the idea that under 3PV, teams adopt more defensive strategies early in the game and more offensive strategies late in the game. Palacios-Huerta (1999) showed that the 3PV rule has not affected significantly the average number of goals in the English Premier League, which seems to indicate that the average level of offensive play is similar under 2PV than under 3PV.
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A Simple Numerical Example
To illustrate the idea that the average strategy under 3PV may be more defensive than under 2PV, consider the following stylized functions that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, and 3: α(θ A , θ B ) = kθ A + lθ B . This means that k represents each team's marginal benefit of playing offensively (i.e., the increase in the probability of scoring) and lθ represents the marginal cost (i.e., the increase in the probability of conceding a goal). Using Equations 1 and 3, it can be easily checked that θ*(2) = θ**(2) = k / l. Also, θ**(3) = 2k / l, α [θ**(3), θ**(3)] = 4k 2 / l, and β(θ, θ) = k. We also have the following:
We can finally compare the average degree of offensive play under 2PV and 3PV as follows:
Overall, as the marginal benefit of playing offensively increases (k increases) or its marginal cost decreases (l decreases), the benefits of a constant strategy during
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the whole match (2PV) outweigh the benefits of a defensive strategy in the first half and an offensive strategy in the second half (3PV).
A Model of the GG Rule
With a very simple extension of our framework, it may be possible to analyze the effect of the GG rule in the strategy of teams. The GG rule has been recently used in the World Cup, the European Cup, and other tournaments at the elimination stage when one and only one team must advance to the next round (it has never been used in pool matches). Before the introduction of this rule, two teams finishing the match tied played during a fixed 30-minute overtime. If the draw persisted, the winner was selected by penalty kicks. According to the new GG rule, the first team to score within the 30 minutes of extra time wins the match. If there are no goals after 30 minutes, then the winner is again determined with the penalty kick method.
The GG rule has two obvious effects: It reduces the expected time of play, and other things being equal, it decreases the probability of deciding the winner by penalty kicks. However, one may wonder if teams adopt more offensive strategies under the GG rule or under the traditional system. In fact, this is important not only because maximizing the level of offensive play is part of the objective function but also because it determines whether in equilibrium fewer matches reach the penalty kick stage (which is the other objective of the rule).
To answer this question, consider the following extension of the model presented in the previous section. The regular game has finished with a draw, and we now model the overtime and only the overtime. Following the previous notations, call t ∈ {1, 2, 3} the beginning, half time, and end of the overtime and consider two different possibilities. In Scenario 1, teams play the entire extra time, and only if it ends up with a draw do they proceed to the penalty kick. In Scenario 2, teams play under the GG rule. The main property of the GG rule is captured with the following assumption: If by half time (t = 2), one team has scored one more goal than its rival, it is declared the winner. Otherwise, they play the second half. If by the end of the extra time, the draw still persists, then teams proceed to the penalty kicks.
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Given that both teams are equally strong, it seems reasonable to assume that each of them will win at penalty kicks with a probability of 1/2. Therefore, there is no loss of generality by normalizing the pay-off of a victory to 2, the pay-off of a draw to 1, and the pay-off of a defeat to 0. Scenario 1 (the traditional system) is then formally equivalent to the analysis of the previous section when x = 2. We The equilibrium strategy γ** selected by both teams for the second half period in case of a tie at half time is unique and solves the following:
By backward induction and once we know the equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 2, we can determine the behavior of players at the beginning of the overtime. Naturally, at that point, the game is tied. Team A's value function is then as follows: 
and we can state our second result.
Proposition 2: The GG rule. γ* = γ** = θ*(2) = θ**(2): In elimination tournaments, the GG rule does not affect the incentives of teams to play offensively. Proof. The proof is immediate by comparing Equations 5 and 6 with Equations 1 and 3 when x = 2.
In elimination tournaments, adopting the GG rule increases the variance in the pay-off of playing offensively. Indeed, once team A has scored a goal (event e 1 = a), its rival B does not have the opportunity to come back in the game. That is, team A gets a pay-off of 2 As a result and exactly for the same reasons as in Proposition 1(a), the incentives of teams to attack are the same in Scenario 1 (traditional system) and Scenario 2
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underlying effects of a rule. With their help, it is possible to evaluate the suitability of past changes and to design new rules that are simple and easy to implement and that constitute an improvement over the existing ones.
CONCLUSION
Soccer is by far the most popular sport throughout the world. Events such as the World Cup or the European Champions League capture the attention of millions of supporters. It has been argued that money and excessive coverage by the media has corrupted the game. Stakes have become so high that spectacular matches are now the exception rather than the rule even if, nobody doubts, the average quality of players rises constantly. Several measures have been adopted in order to keep the thrill of the game. However, to our knowledge, only rules of thumb rather than carefully thought arguments have been presented as the main reasons in favor of the changes proposed.
This article has demonstrated that simple economic concepts (such as dynamic optimization, option value, and Nash equilibrium) and a rigorous modeling can be helpful in understanding some basic (although nontrivial) effects of sport rules on the behavior of players. Using these elements, we have studied the merits of two controversial changes in soccer rules: the 3PV and the GG. From a positive viewpoint, our analysis has drawn simple and clear recommendations for the modification of rules. Given the availability of data on soccer, a natural next step would be to test our predictions.
Last, one might wonder whether the design of sport rules deserves the attention of researchers. In our view, professional sport has become an important part of our everyday lives. Many decisions, including allocation of leisure, allocation of money, and social conduct, are affected by sport events. We therefore feel that there is indeed an economic and social interest in understanding sports and optimizing their rules.
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